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Abstract
We propose an analytic, time-variant model that conservatively evaluates the increase in reli-
ability achievable when a component is equipped with a Prognostics and Health Management
system of known performance metrics. The reliability model builds on metrics of literature
and is applicable to diﬀerent industrial contexts. A simulated case study concerning crack
propagation in a mechanical component is considered to validate the proposed model.
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Symbols & Acronyms
∆t Time interval between two successive Remaining Useful Life (RUL) predictions
λ Time window modiﬁer, such that tλ = Tpr + λ(Tf − Tpr); λ ∈ [0, 1]
λ∗ Time from which the values of the performance metrics are estimated
bxc Integer part of x; that is, n ≤ x < n+ 1, x ∈ R, n ∈ N
N (µ, σ2) Normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
U(a, b) Uniform distribution between a and b
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Υλ Point summarizing the uncertainty in Rλ (e.g., mean, median, 10
th percentile, etc.)
DTD Detection Time Delay, Tpr − Td
fDTD probability density function (pdf) of DTD
fRλ pdf of the predicted RUL at the time window indicated by λ
fTd pdf of time Td
fTφ pdf of Tφ
fTf pdf of Tf
FN False Negatives
FP False Positives
h∗ Index of the ﬁrst time channel at which a missing alarm is risky
k∗ Index of the ﬁrst time channel at which the decision to remove the system from operation
can be taken
m Empirical estimate of metric M
N Number of maximum RUL predictions before failure
Pαλ α-λ performance
Rλ Uncertain predicted RUL at time indicated by λ
RUL∗λ Actual RUL at the time indicated by λ
Td Time instant at which the system reaches the detection threshold
Tf Time instant at which the system reaches the failure threshold
Tφ Length of the time interval Tf − Td
Tpr Time of the ﬁrst RUL prediction
1 Introduction
In the last decade, Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) has often been proposed as an
eﬀective technology to respond to the reliability challenges posed by the modern safety-critical
components and systems (e.g., nuclear power plants, oil&gas assets, etc.), in which failures can
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result not only in signiﬁcant costs, but also in life-threatening consequences such as explosions and
natural disasters.
PHM allows in principle monitoring the system health condition, predicting its Remaining Useful
Life (RUL) and, ultimately, preventing catastrophic failures ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5]). However, in prac-
tice it is important to know which are the reliability and availability of a component or system.
In this respect, to the authors' best knowledge a modeling framework that allows translating the
PHM contribution into the component or system reliability is still lacking.
A few works have attempted to evaluate the inﬂuence of PHM on system Life Cycle Cost (LCC,
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]), looking at the economic beneﬁts of PHM in terms of increase of compo-
nent or system availability. On the other hand, for safety-critical applications PHM is expected to
mainly increase the component or system reliability (rather than availability). PHM helps avoiding
over-estimations of the actual component RUL, which may lead to accidents with possible conse-
quences on the asset, the environment and the public.
To evaluate the added value of the PHM technology on system reliability, it is necessary to char-
acterize the performance of the PHM adopted. In this respect, a variety of performance metrics
and indicators have been introduced for detection (i.e., the recognition of a deviation from the
normal operating conditions causing such deviation, e.g., [8], [12]), diagnostics (i.e., the character-
ization of the abnormal state, e.g., [13]) and prognostics, (i.e., the prediction of the evolution of
the abnormal state up to failure, e.g., [2], [14], [15]). The original contribution of this work is to
propose a general modeling and decision framework for linking PHM metrics of literature to the
component reliability. This framework also allows accounting for the decision criterion adopted
for maintenance (overhaul), which heavily depends on the risk attitude of the decision maker.
The proposed reliability model is validated by way of a simulated case study concerning the crack
propagation in a mechanical component, which requires to estimate the values of the relevant PHM
metrics.
Although various deﬁnitions of performance metrics exist in the PHM literature, a detailed proce-
dure to estimate their values is still lacking, apart from a few metrics such as the MTTF [16]. For
this, a further original contribution of our work is the Monte Carlo (MC) procedure proposed to
estimate the performance metrics encoded in the developed reliability model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy introduces the general frame-
work; in Section 3, the impact of a PHM tool on system reliability is modeled; Section 4 illustrates
a simulated case study concerning the crack propagation in a mechanical component; Section 5
validates the developed model by way of the simulated case study; Section 6 concludes the work.
3
2 Modeling framework
We consider a degrading component, whose degradation state is monitored every ∆t units of time
with respect to a continuous indicator variable (Figure 1). The degradation process is stochastic
for the degradation state and two thresholds are considered: the detection threshold, which mainly
depends on the characteristics of the instrument used for monitoring the degradation variable (for
example, considering that the instrument is not capable of detecting the degradation state for val-
ues below such threshold), and the failure threshold, above which the component does not function
any more or, more practically, must be maintained or replaced for avoiding a catastrophic failure.
The uncertainty in the time instant Td at which the component reaches the ﬁrst threshold is
described by the probability density function (pdf) fTd . If no action is taken, the component
continues its degrading up to failure occurring at time Tf ; its uncertainty is described by pdf fTf .
Finally, we also consider the random variable Tφ = Tf − Td, whose pdf is fTφ .
Realistically, it is assumed that detection is not perfect. Thus, metrics of literature are exploited
to characterize the detection performance. In this respect, the following two are widely used in
practice: false positive probability (i.e., the probability of triggering undue alarms) and false nega-
tive probability (i.e., the probability of missing alarm when required) ([8]). In addition, Detection
Time Delay (DTD, [12]) is a detection metric which measures the interval from the time when
the detectable degradation state is reached by the component up to its detection. We use this
performance metric, due to two main reasons: on one hand, DTD is viewed as a false negative
indicator which depends on time (i.e., alarms are missing up to DTD); on the other hand, the
DTD values are dependent on the detection algorithm settings, which can be adjusted so that the
false positive probability is negligible in the inital part of the component life ([12]). This way, the
model development is simpliﬁed. To be realistic, we assume that DTD is aﬀected by uncertainty,
whose pdf is fDTD(δ).
In this setting, the PHM system starts to predict the RUL at time Tpr = (bTd+DTD∆t c+ 1)∆t, where
b◦c indicates the integer part of its argument. The number of predictions that the PHM can
perform before failure is N = bTf−Tpr
∆t
c. From now on, it is assumed that the system actually fails
at time Tpr +N∆t, instead of Tf ; the smaller ∆t, the smaller the approximation.
Notice that we have assumed, for simplicity, that the considered component is aﬀected by a single
failure mode, so that we do not have the need of tackling the issue of embedding diagnostic met-
rics into the reliability model, and of considering all scenarios originating from decisions based on
erroneous diagnoses of the failure mode. Such diagnostic issue is left for the future research work.
Finally, notice also that, in practice, both detection and failure thresholds may not be easily de-
termined. For example, in helicopter applications, PHM systems (also called Health and Usage
Monitoring System, HUMS) are mainly based on vibration monitoring to infer the equipment
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health ([17], [18], [19]); thus, there is no simple way to deﬁne a threshold directly related to failure.
Similar challenges are encountered in the packaging industry, where the failure conditions of com-
ponents may not be precisely known [20]. Nonetheless, the approach proposed in the present work
applies to any system, provided that some criterion to deﬁne the thresholds exists. The deﬁnition
of such criterion is out of the scope of this work, where we assume that the Decision Maker (DM)
has already deﬁned a threshold coherent with his/her objective.
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Figure 1: Model setting description; h = 4, α = 0.1, N1 = 11 and N2 = 19
3 Reliability Model
In this Section, we illustrate the mathematical model developed to evaluate the increase in system
reliability brought by a PHM system.
We assume that the PHM-equipped component is stopped when the (100 − β)th percentile (e.g.,
100−90 = 10th) of the currently predicted RUL pdf is smaller than h ·∆t: the larger the value of β,
the smaller the value of the predicted RUL percentile, the more risk-averse the decision. Similarly,
the larger the value of h, the more cautious the decision maker.
To set h and β in real industrial applications, it should be kept in mind that the value of h strongly
depends on the time required to safely remove the component from operation (e.g., time required
for system shutdown), whereas β relates to the risk associated to the failure (e.g., β = 5 is a very
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conservative value, suitable for safety critical application). To help the DM to set h and β we can
use the proposed reliability model in a `reverse' way, to ﬁnd the combinations of values of h and
β that allow meeting the system reliability requirements, also taking into account the considered
PHM performance values. Furthermore, we can evaluate the sensitivity of the component reliabil-
ity value to the selected applicable values of h and β, to ﬁnd the settings which are less sensitive
to the possible variability of the metrics due to the uncertainty in their estimations.
To evaluate the probability of removing the system from operation before failure, we need to con-
sider a time-variant prognostic performance index and link it to the probability of being in stopping
conditions.
Among the prognostic metrics available in the literature ([14], [15]), the most suitable is the α−λ
performance index, Pαλ , which is a time-variant accuracy indicator ranging in [0, 1]; this allows
us to give Pαλ a probabilistic interpretation. Various deﬁnitions of P
α
λ have been proposed in the
literature ([14], [15]), referring to either point-wise or pdf RUL predictions. In this work, we give
the following deﬁnition, derived from [14] (Figure 2).
Td Tpr tλ1 tλ2 tλ3 Tf
Tf
R
UL
time
fRλ1 |
α+
λ1
α−
λ1
≤ β: Παλ1 = 0
fRλ3 |
α+
λ3
α−
λ3
≥ β:
Παλ3 = 1
Figure 2: Pαλ description
Consider the indicator variable:
Παλ =
1, if fRλ|
α+λ
α−λ
≥ β
0, else
(1)
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where fRλ is the pdf of the RUL Rλ predicted at time tλ = Tpr + λ(Tf −Tpr), λ ∈ [0, 1], whereas α
is a user-deﬁned parameter which indicates the required tolerance around the value of RUL∗(e.g.,
α ∈ [0.05, 0.2]).
Then, Pαλ is the mean value of Π
α
λ , i.e., P
α
λ = E[Παλ ].
Namely, during the test campaign of the algorithm, in which the value of the prognostic perfor-
mance metrics are computed, the algorithm is run on the working system an as large as possible
number of times. Then, at any trial, Παλ is set to 1 if the RUL pdf predicted at tλ has an area larger
than β between α−λ = (1−α)RUL∗λ and α+λ = (1 +α)RUL∗λ, being RUL∗λ the actual RUL at time
tλ, i.e., the time up to reaching the failure threshold or the threshold above which a maintenance
action must be performed, depending on the application (Figure 2). The RUL∗ value is exactly
known at the end of every trial.
Pαλ is, then, practically given by the estimate p
α
λ , which is calculated by averaging the values Π
α
λ
gathered from diﬀerent trials of the PHM tool at as many as possible instants tλ. The larger the
value of Pαλ , the better the PHM system prediction capability. For more details on p
α
λ computation,
see Section 5.2.
Notice that when Παλ = 0, no inference can be made about the value of the uncertain RUL pre-
diction: one only knows that the area overlapping [α−λ , α
+
λ ] is smaller than β, with no further
information about either the actual extent of this overlapping or the portion of probability mass
located below α−λ , above α
+
λ or in an in-between position.
Notice also that when Παλ = 1, then the interval [(1 − α)RUL∗λ, (1 + α)RUL∗λ] is the 2-sided β
conﬁdence interval of the failure time predicted at time tλ. However, for the prediction metrics to
be applicable for supporting risk-averse decision making, we need to refer to an upper bound of
the probability of over-estimating the RUL (i.e., of not stopping the component), rather than to
a 2-sided conﬁdence interval. To cope with this situation, we combine Pαλ with the False Positive
and False Negative metrics [15], which are time-variant indexes deﬁned as, respectively:
FNλ = E[ΦNλ], ΦNλ =
1, if Υλ −RUL∗λ > dthresholdλ0, else (2)
FPλ = E[ΦPλ], ΦPλ =
1, if Υλ −RUL∗λ < −dthresholdλ0, else (3)
where Υλ is a point estimate of the predicted RUL distribution (e.g., the mean, the median or
any other percentile of Rλ, etc.) and d
thresold
λ is a user-deﬁned threshold value, which depends
on the PHM application. Proceeding exactly in the same way as that of pαλ , we will consider
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the estimates fnλ and fpλ of FNλ and FPλ, respectively, which are given by the corresponding
empirical averages of ΦNλ and ΦPλ over the available number of test trials, achieved through an
algorithm test campaign. As mentioned above, notice that when performing a PHM test, RUL∗
is exactly known at the end of every trial. This value is, then, used to estimate ΦNλ, ΦPλ and the
other variables of the model, as shown in Section 5.2.
In our setting, Υλ is the (1−β)th percentile of fRλ and dthresholdλ = α×RUL∗λ. Then, FPλ measures
the average portion of times in which Υλ is below α
−
λ = (1 − α)RUL∗λ and, thus, it becomes an
indicator of how much conservative our PHM predictions are at time tλ. Similarly, FNλ indicates
the riskiness of the PHM algorithm.
Based on these considerations, we can build the reliability model of a PHM-equipped component
with estimated values pαλ , fnλ, fpλ of metrics P
α
λ , FNλ, FPλ, respectively. To do this, we divide
the time horizon into three regions (Figure 3):
1. The region in proximity of failure, which is deﬁned by the time indexes k ≥ N − h such
that (1 + α)RUL∗λ ≤ h∆t, where RUL∗λ = (N − h)∆t. This is the same as k ≥ h∗, where
h∗ = bN − h
1+α
c. Geometrically, this region corresponds to time values on the right of
the intersection between the error upper bound line (1 + α)RUL∗λ and the horizontal line
positioned at RUL = h∆t (Figure 3).
2. The safe region, which is indicated by time instants k < k∗, where k∗ geometrically corre-
sponds to the prediction most proximal to the intersection between the prediction error lower
bound line (1− α)RUL∗λ and the horizontal line at RUL = h∆t (Figure 3).
3. The in-between region, identiﬁed by k∗ ≤ k < h∗.
With respect to region 1, we can note that to have a failure, the alarm is required to be missing
h∗ consecutive times. Now, if Παλ = 1, then the alarm is triggered and the component failure is
avoided. On the contrary, if Παλ = 0, the necessary condition to not activate the alarm is that the
RUL is over-estimated. This situation occurs with probability (1 − Pαλ )FNλ ' (1 − pαλ)fnλ. We
assume that this probability value also describes the uncertainty in having missing alarms; this is a
very conservative assumptions: the closer the current time to failure, the larger the over-estimation
error required to not trigger the alarm (predictions must be above the h∆t threshold (see Figure
3)).
With respect to the safe region, we ﬁrst note that whichever the value of Παλ , an over-estimation
of RUL∗λ leads to not stopping the system before failure. This does not entail any risk of missing
stops. On the contrary, an under-estimation of the RUL could lead to component stop. In the risk-
averse setting we are dealing with, the anticipated maintenance is beneﬁcial for system reliability,
as it avoids component failure. For this, we conservatively assume that in this left-most region the
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PHM system never stops the component.
Finally, with respect to the in-between time horizon region, to rigorously derive the probability of
not stopping the system, we have to give account to the fact that some extreme cases may occur,
where even if Παλ = 1, the 1− β probability mass and, thus, the (1− β)th percentile, is positioned
above h∆t. For example, Figure 3 shows the situation where tλ1 = (N − h)∆t and all the β mass
is concentrated between RUL∗λ = h∆t and α
+
λ . In this case, PHM will not advice to stop the
component at tλ1 . Thus, we conservatively assume that in this region the component does not
undergo a maintenance action as long as Παλ = 1.
On the contrary, when Παλ = 0, which occurs with probability (1−Pαλ ), the following three possible
situations can occur:
• The (1 − β)th percentile, Υλ, is smaller than (1 − α)RUL∗λ. In this situation, which occurs
with probability (1−Pαλ )FPλ, even if we conservatively assume that the (1− β)th percentile
takes the largest possible value (i.e., Υλ = (1− α)RUL∗λ), the component is stopped as this
time is smaller than h∆t.
• With probability (1−Pαλ )FNλ, Υλ will be above (1 +α)RUL∗λ. In this situation, we will not
stop the component.
• With probability 1− FNλ − FPλ we are in the situation in which the predicted RUL value
is between [α−λ α
+
λ ]. To be conservative, we assume that also in this case we do not remove
the component from operation.
To conclude, a conservative estimation of the stop probability in the time window [Tpr+k
∗∆t, Tpr+
h∗∆t] is (1− Pαλ )FPλ ' (1− pαλ)fpλ.
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FPλ(1− P αλ )
region 2 region 3 region 1
Figure 3: Regions partitioning the time horizon and examples of possible RUL predictions
Figure 1 brieﬂy summarizes the considerations proposed above. Two diﬀerent trials of the same
PHM-equipped component are plotted over time, which are indicated with superscript 1 (continu-
ous line) and 2 (dashed line). T 1pr and T
2
pr indicate the corresponding ﬁrst prediction times, whereas
k∗1 and k∗2 represent the ﬁrst time instants where the system can be stopped with probabilities
(1−Pαλ )FPλ; h∗1 and h∗2 are the ﬁrst time indexes from which the system is stopped with proba-
bility Pαk
N
+ (1−Pαk
N
)(1−FN k
N
). Finally, T 1f and T
2
f represent the last possible prediction instants
before failure and are considered as failure times within our framework.
Based on the considerations above, it is now possible to compute the unreliability U(t) at time t,
which is here deﬁned as the probability of reaching the failure threshold before t:
U(t) = P(Tf ≤ t ∩ system not stopped before t ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ) =
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P(Tf ≤ t | system not stopped before t ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ)×
P(system not stopped before t ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ)
where α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ explicitly indicate the dependence of the unreliability value on the
parameters determining the performance of the PHM system.
Notice that there are several deﬁnitions of reliability [21]. Diﬀerently from the `traditional' deﬁ-
nitions, in which the unreliability is the CDF of the failure time and, thus, it tends to one as t
increases (i.e., the component will always fail, [21], [22]), in this case we are compelled to con-
sider
lim
t→∞
U(t) = P(system not stopped before t ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ) ≤ 1
The diﬀerence is due to the fact that if the component is removed from operation before failure,
then its failure time will no-longer exist and the `traditional' deﬁnitions are no longer applicable.
That is, the PHM-equipped component can be framed as a three-state system, the possible states
being: Working, Failed and Removed (Figure 4), in which U(t) represents the probability of
having a transition from Working to Failed before time t.
Working
Failed
K(t, Failed)
Removed
K(
t, R
em
ove
d)
Figure 4: Three-state system
According to this view, we derive U(t) from the probabilistic transport kernel K(t, Failed|t′, s′),
which is deﬁned as the probability density that the component makes the next transition between
t and t+ dt toward state Failed [23], provided that the previous transition has occurred at time t′
and that the system had entered in state s′. However, in our case we assume that the component
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always starts at t = 0 in state Working. For this, we will indicate the kernel as K(t, Failed),
without the conditioning event.
To calculateK(t, Failed), we ﬁrst ﬁrst calculate the failure transportation kernel given a realization
δ from fDTD:
K(t, Failed|δ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ) =
∫ t
t−δ
fTd(τ)fTφ(t− τ)dτ+
+
∫ t−δ
0
fTd(τ)fTφ(t− τ)
h∗−1∏
k=k∗
[1− (1− pαk
N
)fp k
N
]
N−1∏
k=h∗
[(1− pαk
N
)fn k
N
]dτ (4)
In other words, it is assumed that a failure occurs when one out of the following conditions is
satisﬁed, which are represented by the ﬁrst and the second addend of Equation 4, respectively:
1. The component fails before PHM alerts the detection threshold (detection error); this may
happen in case the component fails abruptly.
2. PHM correctly detects, with detection delay δ, that the degradation has reached the detection
threshold but, then, over-estimates the actual failure time Tf (prognostic error); this happens
after Tpr+k
∗∆t (i.e., the ﬁrst prediction instant where the stopping decision should be made),
with probability 1− (1− pαk
N
)fp k
N
and with probability (1− pαk
N
)fn k
N
from Tpr + h
∗∆t on.
To remove the dependence from δ, we integrate Equation 4 over the distribution of DTD:
K(t, Failed;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ) =
∫ ∞
0
K(t, Failed|δ;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ)fDTD(δ)dδ (5)
Generally speaking, the integral of K(t, Failed) over the time interval [t1, t2] gives the probability
of failure in that time span [23]. Then, Equation 5 allows estimating the component unreliability
as:
U(t) =
∫ t
0
K(τ, Failed;α, β,∆t, h, fn, fp, pαλ)dτ (6)
Finally, notice that the developed model allows considering also the case where there is no ad-
vantage in removing the component from operation the last h instants: in this case, stopping the
component in the third region (region 1 in Figure 3) is equivalent to having a failure.
4 Case study
In this Section, we illustrate the application of the modeling framework developed to a component
aﬀected by fatigue degradation, described by the Paris Erdogan (PE) model ([2], [24], Figure
5):
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1. The crack length xi reaches the ﬁrst threshold, x = 1mm, according to the following equation:
xi+1 = xi + a× eω1i
where a = 0.003 is the growth speed parameter and ω1i ∼ N (−0.625, 1.5) models the uncer-
tainty in the speed values. The uncertainty in the arrival time at x = 1 is described by pdf
fTd(t).
2. The crack length reaches the failure threshold x = 100mm according to the following equa-
tion:
xi+1 = xi + C × eω2i (η√xi)n
where C = 0.005 and n = 1.3 are parameters related to the component material properties,
and are determined by experimental tests; η = 1 is a constant related to the characteristics
of the load and the position of the crack and ω2i ∼ N (0, 1) describes the uncertainty in the
crack growth speed values. The uncertainty in the arrival time at x = 100 is described by
pdf fTf (t).
The numerical values are taken from [2].
Td Tf
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Td
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
cr
ac
k
le
n
gt
h
time
Detection Threshold x = 1
(b) Zoom before ﬁrst threshold
Figure 5: Crack propagation process: example
5 Validation of the reliability model
The aim of this Section is to validate the reliability model developed in Section 3 by way of the
case study presented above. To do this, we carry out the following steps, which are detailed in the
next Sections:
• Choose the prognostic and detection algorithms that are assumed to be implemented in the
PHM system.
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• Estimate the performance values fpλ, fnλ and pαλ .
• Estimate the integral in Equation 6.
• Estimate the unreliability in the `on-line' setting, in which the crack propagation is simulated
together with the selected prognostic and detection algorithms, and with the decisions based
on their outcomes as well.
5.1 Algorithms
The prognostic algorithm we rely on is Particle Filtering (PF, [25], [26]), which has been estab-
lished as the de-facto state of the art in failure prognostics [27]. Brieﬂy, at any time instant PF
estimates the pdf of the degradation state of the component (i.e., its crack depth in our case) with
a set of weighted particles, which constitute a probability mass function (pmf). When a measure
of the crack depth is acquired, such pmf is adjusted in a Bayesian perspective, so that the weights
related to particles which are near the acquired data are augmented.
The PF algorithm chosen for our application is the same as that used in [1]; it relies on a simpliﬁed
approach for predicting the evolution of the crack, which does not give full account to the uncer-
tainty in the particle evolution ([1]). Certainly, more reﬁned versions of PF could be considered to
improve the prognostic performance, but this is out of the scope of this work: our aim is to check
whether the model developed in Section 3 provides conservative estimates of the component relia-
bility for a given set of performance values fpλ, fnλ, and p
α
λ , whichever the prognostic algorithm
is.
As mentioned in Section 2, our model mainly focuses on prognostics. Thus, we assume that the
uncertainty in DTD is already known and it is described by a normal distribution, which for the
simulations that follows, is arbitrarily taken to have mean 5 and standard deviation 1, in arbitrary
units. Then, in the simulations, the degradation is detected to reach the detection threshold at
a time Tpr, which is on average 5 time units larger than Td and the variability of this delay is
given by the standard deviation of 1 unit. Finally, with respect to the maintenance policy settings,
we assume h = 1, β = 40 and ∆t = 30 in arbitrary units: larger values of h or smaller values
of β would result in reliability values very close to 1, which do not allow a fair validation of the
proposed modeling framework.
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5.2 Performance estimation
To estimate the values of the performance metrics FPλ, FNλ and P
α
λ , we implement the following
MC procedure:
1. Simulate the crack propagation mechanism to ﬁnd Tf , Td, the N prediction instants at every
∆t time and the corresponding crack lengths. In particular, Tpr is obtained by adding a
sample from N (5, 1) to Td, whereas Tf = RUL∗ at λ = 0. The gathered values of Tf and Td
are also used to derive fTφ and fTd , respectively, at step 3.
2. At every prediction instant tλ, λ =
tλ−Tpr
Tf−Tpr , run the PF algorithm to estimate the current
crack length and the pdf fRλ of the predicted RUL Rλ. On this basis, use Equations 1-3 to
calculate the values of ΦPλ, ΦNλ and Π
α
λ using fRλ and RUL
∗
λ = Tf − tλ. In this respect,
Figure 6, shows the histograms of k
∗
N
and h
∗
N
over λ as derived from the simulation of 15000
Monte Carlo trials of crack degradation: it can be seen that in almost 90% of the trials,
k∗
N
≥ 0.9 and h∗
N
≥ 0.95. This implies that we can avoid calculating ΦPλ, ΦNλ, and Παλ for
all values of λ; rather, we can reduce the range of interest at λ > λ∗, for some appropriate
value of λ∗.
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3. Once steps 1-2 are simulated a large number of times and the corresponding values of ΦPλ,
ΦNλ, and Π
α
λ are collected, divide [λ
∗, 1) in I intervals of the same length [λi, λi+1), λ0 = λ∗,
λI = 1; I should be small enough that intervals [λi, λi+1) do not contain multiple prediction
instants of the same MC trial. Derive also fTd and fTφ .
4. For each interval [λi, λi+1), compute the average of the values of ΦPλ, ΦNλ, and Π
α
λ gathered
at the time instant λ ∈ [λi, λi+1); this provides the estimates fpλ, fnλ, and pαλ , which are
step-wise functions over the identiﬁed I intervals.
Figures 7 and 8 provide an example of the described procedure for 3 MC trials, in which λ∗ = 0.1.
The degradation paths are simulated over time (Figure 7) and the corresponding values of interest
are collected. Figure 7 also reports for every degradation path the λ values corresponding to the
prediction instants, which depend on the duration of the component life. Then, Figure 8 partitions
the interval [0.1; 1) in intervals of length 0.06, which contain at most one prediction instant of the
same trial. In this respect, a simple rule to select the maximum λ interval length is to select the
maximum number Nm of prediction instants in a single trial; then, the maximum λ interval length
is 1
Nm
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Figure 7: Example of degradation evolutions and computation of λ related to prediction instants
16
0.1 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.4 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.64 0.7 0.76 0.82 0.88 0.94
0.15 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.69 0.77 0.85 0.92
0.13 0.25 0.38 0.5 0.63 0.75 0.88
0.18 0.27 0.36 0.45 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.91
λ
Figure 8: Computation of the performance metric values of Figure 7
Figure 9 shows the results of the procedure detailed above for the case study illustrated in Section
4, starting from λ ≥ λ∗ = 0.45. In particular, two diﬀerent length values of the [λi, λi+1) intervals
have been considered: 0.05 (Figure 9a) and 0.005 (Figure 9b). In both cases, we checked that every
interval contains at most one prediction instant of the same trial, although for some simulated trial
some intervals do not contain any prediction (see Figure 8). This causes the noisy behavior of the
metrics in Figure 9b, as the narrower the interval [λi, λi+1), the smaller the corresponding number
of gathered values of ΦPλ, ΦNλ and Π
α
λ over the Monte Carlo trials, the larger the MC error
aﬀecting the averaged values.
From the analysis of Figure 9, we can notice that both the fp and fn values increase over λ, except
for λ ≥ 0.95. This is due to fact that when λ ' 1, RUL∗ = N(1−λ)∆t ' 0; hence, on one side the
chances of having φp = 1 reduces, whereas on the other side there is no possibility to have φn = 0.
This entails that fpλ and fnλ tend to converge to 0 and 1, respectively as λ→ 1. Moreover, fp is
always larger than fn, except when λ ≥ 0.95. This can be easily explained remembering that we
are tracing a percentile of the RUL, which favors the false positive alarms. For the same reason,
pαλ tends to converge to 0 in the last part of the component life cycle: when the component is
approaching its failure time, the RUL estimations become more precise; then, tracking a percentile
instead of the RUL median introduces a bias that impacts on the prediction accuracy (see Figure
2). Notice that this behavior does not contradict the presented model: predictions done at failure
time are not considered, as the component is always assumed to fail at N∆t, which implies that
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the largest possible value of λ = (N−1)
N
< 1.
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Figure 9: Experimental metrics values
5.3 Component unreliability estimation
To estimate the component unreliability based on Equations 4, 5 and 6, the following procedure,
derived from [23], has been implemented:
• Divide the time horizon in J time intervals of length ∆t, [0, t1), [t1, t2), . . . , [tJ−1, tJ ], and
associate a counter to every interval, whose initial value is set to 0.
• Sample δ ∼ fDTD; this way, we can estimate the Kernel in Equation 4, which is conditional
on DTD.
• Compute the ﬁrst addendum of Equation 4 by Monte Carlo, evaluating the integral corre-
sponding to the undetected failure probability: for each failure time tj, we sample Tpr from
U(tj − δ, tj), i.e., a uniform distribution between tj − δ and tj (see forced simulation in [23]).
• Compute the second integral of Equation 4, similarly to the previous one except that Tpr
must be sampled from U(0, tj − δ). Then, k∗, h∗ and N are computed, and the values of the
performance metrics obtained are used to complete Equation 4.
• Estimate k(tj, Failed) of the integral in Equation 5 by applying MC method ([23]).
• Estimate the unreliability at time tj (Equation 6), by summing all the failure contributions
on the right of tj:
u(tj) ' ∆t
j∑
i=1
[k(tj, Failed)] j = 1, . . . , J
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5.4 Estimation of the `on-line' unreliability
The online unreliability is estimated through the MC procedure developed in [1]. Brieﬂy, the time
horizon is partitioned in time-channels of length ∆t units of time. The crack growth process is
simulated over time together with DTD to compute Td. If Tpr ≥ Tf , the unreliability counters
associated to the channels from Tf to the end of the time window are set to 1; otherwise, the
empirical pdf fRλ is estimated every ∆t units of time by means of the Particle Filtering. Then,
at each prediction time tλ, if the predicted β
th percentile of fRλ is before the next h
th inspection
time, then the component is removed from operation, otherwise it continues to work. The trial
simulation continues until either the component fails or is removed from operation: in the former
case, the unreliability counters associated to the channels from Tf to the end of the time window
are set to 1; otherwise they are set to 0. Finally, the online unreliability at every ∆t is estimated
as the average over many MC simulation trials of the accumulated counter values. As mentioned
before, we expect that the oine unreliability curve is always above the online one, as we have
built a model which under-estimates the safety beneﬁt of a PHM system.
5.5 Results
Figure 10 shows the two unreliability curves obtained using the two methods described above.
The bars in Figure 10 represent the 68% two-sided conﬁdence interval of the MC simulation error,
both in the on-line and oﬀ-line setting. From the analysis of the Figure, it seems fair to say that
the proposed reliability model is accurate, as the two curves are close to each other. Notice that
the diﬀerence between the two curves increases with time, meaning that there are no prediction
instants at which our model over-estimates the component stopping probability.
19
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
time
u
n
re
lia
bi
lity
 
 
offline
online
Figure 10: Comparison between `on-line' and `oﬀ-line' unreliabilities
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a novel general framework to compute the reliability of a PHM-
equipped component. The modeling framework proposed applies to safety critical components and
risk-averse contexts (e.g., applications of the nuclear, aerospace, oil and gas industries), where the
main concern is to prevent the component from unexpected failures.
The proposed framework is based on time-variant prognostic metrics of literature (FP , FN and
Pαλ ) and allows deriving a conservative, analytic model to estimate the failure probability. Appli-
cation to a mechanical component subject to fatigue degradation has shown that the reliability
estimate is close to that obtained from real-time simulation and always under-estimating it.
Further research work is ongoing to investigate the application of the developed reliability model
to other engineering applications and to propose further improvements in the reliability model,
e.g., for relaxing some conservative assumptions or approximations.
In particular, future research work will focus on the extension of the proposed approach to multi-
component systems ([28], [29]). This will require to encode the diagnostic performance metrics
in the proposed reliability model, so as to give due account to the possible system failure paths
corresponding to the diﬀerent degradation evolutions of its components.
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